App. App. In truth, the article was not lemon oil, but an imitation thereof containing alcohol and citral made from lemon grass. Trooper Cavazos activated his emergency lights and took chase. 99-5746. The defendant filed in the cause before the time for trial the following petition: "Petition to Return Private Papers, Books, and Other Property. Ibid. Justia › US Law › Case Law › North Dakota Case Law › North Dakota Supreme Court Decisions › 2011 › Weeks v. Workforce Safety & Insurance Receive free daily summaries of new opinions from the North Dakota Supreme Court. Under such circumstances, without sworn information and particular description, not even an order of court would. More than two hours passed between the judge directing the jury's attention to the appropriate paragraph of the instruction that answered its question and the jury returning its verdict. Thus, once the jury received the judge's response to its question, it had not only the text of the instruction we approved in Buchanan, but also the additional instruction on mitigation, see n. 2, supra, and its own recollection of defense counsel's closing argument for guidance. 768, specifies and defines at least two kinds of "misbranding" -- one where the article bears a false or misleading label and the other where it is offered for sale under the distinctive name of another article. It seems to me far more likely that the reason they did not ask the same question a second time is that the jury believed that it would be disrespectful to repeat a simple, unambiguous question that the judge had already refused to answer directly. The printed record, although not purporting to contain all the evidence, shows that there was testimony tending to prove the following facts, among others: the shipment was made to fill an order solicited and taken by a traveling salesman in the defendant's employ. The jury was thus allowed to impose a life sentence even if it found the aggravating factor proved." The record in this case establishes, not just a "reasonable likelihood" of jury confusion, but a virtual certainty that the jury did not realize that there were two distinct legal bases for concluding that a death sentence was not "justified." Post, at 238. The Federal District Court denied him federal habeas relief, and the Fourth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability and dismissed his petition. The seventh count, upon which a conviction was had, charged the use of the mails for the purpose of transporting certain coupons or tickets representing chances or shares in a lottery or gift enterprise, in violation of § 213 of the Criminal Code. Petitioner had stolen the vehicle in a home burglary earlier in the month. That one article of food may be offered for sale in the distinctive name of another, and the offer accomplish its purpose, without the aid of a false or misleading label hardly needs statement. Resistance to these practices had established the principle which was enacted into the fundamental law in the Fourth Amendment, that a man's house was his castle, and not to be invaded by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers. 199-200. Id., at 217. For two obvious reasons that is not so. Pp.231-237. Id., at 283. The judge responded to the jury's question as follows: "You should impose such punishment as you feel is just under the evidence, and within the instructions of the Court. People v. Adams, supra. 222-223. But the most likely explanation is that the jury was doing exactly what it was instructed to do: that is, weighing the mitigating circumstances against the aggravating circumstance that it found to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ", The history of this Amendment is given with particularity in the opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for. Petitioner proceeded to fire six bullets at the trooper, two of which entered his body near the right and left shoulder straps of his protective vest, and four of which entered his forearms and left wrist. Many of them are collected in the note to State v. Turner, 136 Am. In view of the different conclusion reached not only by this Court, but by the Virginia trial judge, seven justices of the Supreme Court of Virginia, a federal habeas District Judge, and three judges of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, this statement can only be described as extravagant hyperbole. It follows that the testimony respecting the representations of the defendant's traveling salesman was rightly admitted in evidence and submitted to the jury. In this context, even if one finds the explanations of the jury's conduct here in equipoise, a 50-50 chance that the jury has not carried out this mandate seems to me overwhelming grounds for reversal.